Constructive Discharge Claims Just Got Easier for Employees

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Supreme Court

Yesterday, the United State Supreme Court released a decision which makes it easier for employees to win constructive discharge claims.  See Green v. Brennan, No. 14-613, 2016 WL 2945236 (May 23, 2016).  A constructive discharge occurs when an employer makes an employee’s working conditions so intolerable that any reasonable person would be compelled to resign their job.

The issue in Green concerned the time limitations period in constructive discharge claims.  Generally, employees are required to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the last discriminatory act.  Under that general rule, some courts required employees to file their EEOC charge within 180 days of the last “bad act” by the employer.  Other courts permitted the employee to file within 180 days of deciding to resign.  Typically, the resignation decision occurred later than the last “bad act” and employees in some courts found their claims barred by the limitations period.

In a 6-2 decision, the Supreme Court found that the limitations period begins to run on the date that the employee declares his resignation — not on the date of the last discriminatory act.  As a result of that decision, employers and employees now have clarity on the limitations period in constructive discharge cases.  But, employees are also given a longer limitations period, which removes one potential defense for employers.

Goodykoontz v. Diamond’s Gentleman’s Club

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Diamonds

Sometimes, fate smiles upon us.  Thus, in my never-ceasing efforts to provide entertaining, yet informative, updates on Alabama employment law, I was pleased to see the reported decision of Goodykoontz v. Diamond’s Gentleman’s Club, No. 15-0553-WS-B, 2016 WL 2743530 (May 10, 2016).  Goodykoontz discusses the perils of age discrimination in the gentleman’s entertainment industry.

Ms. Goodykoontz was retained as a dancer at Diamond’s Gentleman’s Club.  After starting work, she was asked her age and reported that she was “almost 41.”  After a shift, the general manager of the club “invited her not to come back.”  When Ms. Goodykoontz inquired further, the general manager said:  “You don’t fit the profile I’m wanting here.”  When Ms. Goodykoontz asked why, he “snarled”:  “Because YOU’RE TOO OLD!!!!”

Diamond’s Gentleman’s Club filed a motion to dismiss Ms. Goodykoontz’s complaint, but that motion was denied.  The club argued that it did not employ the sufficient number of employees to be subject to liability under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and that Ms. Goodykoontz was an independent contractor instead of an employee.  Nevertheless, the federal judge reviewing the motion found sufficient allegations in the complaint to allow the action to proceed.

Goodykoontz is still in the early stages of litigation.  If the club can demonstrate that it does not employ 20 employees, or if it can prove that Ms. Goodykoontz was an independent contractor, it will probably win the case at summary judgment.  Nevertheless, if the club fails on those issues, the statements by the general manager are probably direct evidence of age discrimination that will allow the case to proceed to trial.

Breaking News: Final Overtime Rule Released

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Attention

Yesterday, the United States Department of Labor released its highly-anticipated (and much-debated) final rule regarding overtime compensation.  Here is a link to the Department of Labor’s Fact Sheet on the new rule:  DOL Fact Sheet on New Overtime Rule

Prior to release of the rule, every prognosticator was trying to predict the new threshold salary for exempt employees.  Currently, that salary is $23,660.  Under the new rule, the threshold salary is $47,476.  That is a massive increase for employers.

The new rule becomes effective on December 1, 2016.  On that date, employees with an annual salary of $47,476 or less must be paid overtime.  I previously advised that employers should begin planning for the new rule here:  What Would Saban Do? Preparation for DOL’s New Overtime Rules  If you have not done so, it’s time to conduct a wage audit of your employees and make difficult decisions regarding salaries.

EEOC Issues Final Rule on ADA and Wellness Programs

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Orange

Yesterday, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued its final rule discussing the interaction of employee wellness programs, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”). The EEOC’s press release can be found here:  EEOC Press Release on Wellness Programs

Wellness programs provide a compliance dilemma for employers.  Generally, those programs are a good thing, because they encourage better health and lifestyle choices for employees.  Nevertheless, the ADA and GINA both generally prohibit employers from obtaining and using information about employees’ health conditions. Both acts contain exceptions that allow employers to ask health-related questions as part of a voluntary wellness program.

But, if an employer offers a financial incentive to employees to join a wellness program, is the program “voluntary”?  The EEOC’s final rule permits employers to ask health-related questions and also offer employees incentives of up to 30 percent of the total cost of self-only coverage.  The rule also implements notice requirements to employees and limitations on the amount of information sharing between the programs and employers.

The new rule goes into effect in 2017.  If you sponsor an employee wellness program, carefully review the new rule to ensure compliance.

Insufficiency in FMLA Paperwork is Not Grounds for Denial of Leave

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Leave of Absence

A recent case from the Northern District of Alabama demonstrates the dangers of denying FMLA leave based insufficient FMLA paperwork.  Hayes v. Voestalpine Nortrak, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-2322-AKK (May 5, 2016).

In Hayes, the employee submitted an FMLA certification from his doctor which said that the employee:  (1) was seen “too many times to list — monthly since 2009”; (2) had impairments expected to continue throughout his life; and, (3) would need follow-up treatment appointments.  Nevertheless, the employer’s Human Resources Director denied the request for FMLA leave because the certification failed to indicate whether the employee would be incapacitated for any period of time or if the employee needed a reduced work schedule.

United States District Court Judge Abul Kallon denied summary judgment for the employer and sent the case to trial.  Judge Kallon particularly faulted the employer for failure to notify the employee in writing of deficiencies in the FMLA paperwork.  The FMLA’s implementing regulations require:

The employer shall advise an employee whenever the employer finds a certification incomplete or insufficient, and shall state in writing what additional information is necessary to make the certification complete or sufficient.  A certification is considered incomplete if the employer receives a certification, but one or more of the applicable entries have not been completed.  A certification is considered insufficient if the employer receives a complete certification, but the information provided is vague, ambiguous, or non-responsive.

29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c).

Because the employer failed to notify the employee in writing of deficiencies in the paperwork, Judge Kallon found a jury issue “about whether the failure to engage in the certification dialogue constituted interference with Hayes’ FMLA leave.”  Hayes, 2016 WL 258791 at *4.

Hayes could be a dangerous case in the future, because of its reference to a “certification dialogue.”  There is no requirement for a “dialogue” under the FMLA, but I expect that some employee-friendly lawyers will argue that employers are required to notify employees of the exact weaknesses in a doctor’s certification, and engage in a “dialogue” to get the certification in a form that will permit FMLA leave.  I don’t believe that there is any such requirement.  Instead, if a physician’s certification is clear on its face, and does not satisfy the requirements for establishing a “serious health condition,” then employers should be able to deny FMLA leave without any further “dialogue.”

Hayes should stand for a much narrower proposition.  An exchange of information with the employee may be required if the doctor’s certification:  (1) has entries that have not been completed; or, (2) is vague, ambiguous or non-responsive.  29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c).  In any event, Hayes provides employers with a cautionary lesson about denying FMLA leave based upon deficiencies in an FMLA certification.

 

“The Shrimp Basket” Pays Big Money In FLSA Claim

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shrimp

A recent case from the Southern District of Alabama demonstrates the substantial costs that can be associated with violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.  See Miller v. Spence, No. 14-0468-CG-B, 2016 WL 2350142 (S.D. Ala. May 3, 2016).

The Defendants in Miller were the owners of seafood restaurants along the Alabama Gulf Coast, including The Shrimp Basket, Mikee’s Seafood, and The Steamer.  The plaintiffs were employed as servers at the restaurants and sued for unpaid compensation in the form of wages and overtime.  Among other things, the servers claimed that they were not paid the federally-mandated minimum wage because a portion of their tips were contributed to a tip pool that included non-tipped employees.

Ultimately, the defendants agreed to pay $260,326.54 as part of a settlement for back wages, liquidated damages and class representative incentive payments.  Additionally, the restaurant owners agreed to pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys $130,000.00 in legal fees.

In Miller, Senior United States District Court Judge Callie Granade was asked to approve the settlement.  Judge Granade approved the payment of $260,326.54 to the servers, but requested additional information before approving the payment of attorneys’ fees.

Nevertheless, Miller provides an important warning to employers about the dangers of violating the Fair Labor Standards Act.  Notably, there are attorneys who represent employees and specialize in NLRB violations.  The same attorneys represented the plaintiffs in Miller and the plaintiffs in the Landry’s “Throwed Rolls” case which I discussed previously:  “Throwed Rolls” and Attorneys’ Fees:  The High Costs of FLSA Violations

EEOC Weighs In On Transgender Bathrooms

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bathrooms

The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has issued a Fact Sheet on Bathroom Access for Transgender Employees.  It can be found here: Fact Sheet On Bathroom Access for Transgender Employees

The EEOC’s Fact Sheet seems to be a response to laws recently passed by States and even local governments.  Among other things, those laws restrict the ability of transgender people to use restrooms consistent with their gender identity.  Thus, the EEOC plainly warns that “state law is not a defense” to a transgender discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Other than providing a warning to governmental entities, the Fact Sheet basically provides a summary of the EEOC’s previous rulings on transgender discrimination, which hold:

 

  • denying an employee equal access to a common restroom corresponding to the employee’s gender identity is sex discrimination;
  • an employer cannot condition this right on the employee undergoing or providing proof of surgery or any other medical procedure; and,
  • an employer cannot avoid the requirement to provide equal access to a common restroom by restricting a transgender employee to a single-user restroom instead (though the employer can make a single-user restroom available to all employees who might choose to use it).

In addition to the EEOC’s Fact Sheet, President Obama’s Executive Order 13672 prohibits transgender discrimination by federal contractors.  The Department of Labor’s Fact Sheet interpreting that order provides:

Under the Final Rule, contractors must ensure that their restroom access policies and procedures do not discriminate based on the sexual orientation or gender identity of an applicant or employee. In keeping with the federal government’s existing legal position on this issue, contractors must allow employees and applicants to use restrooms consistent with their gender identity.

That fact sheet can be found here:  DOL Fact Sheet on LGBT Discrimination

 

I previously discussed LGBT issues here:  EMERGING LGBT ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE.  The EEOC is clearly looking to enforce Title VII to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity or sexual orientation.  At this point, the best advice for employers is to ensure that transgender employees are provided equal access to restrooms consistent with their gender identity.

 

Mishandling Company Funds Is Grounds For Termination

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Cash

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently recognized that repeated mishandling of company funds in a short time period is a legitimate basis for terminating an employee.  Chukes v. Sailormen, Inc., No. 15-12192, 2016 WL 1534071 (11th Cir. Apr. 15, 2016).

Chukes began work as an Assistant Manager for a Popeye’s restaurant franchise in September 2012.  By October 26, 2012, her restaurant’s safe was short on cash at least three occasions.  On that date, the franchise suspended Chukes and launched an investigation into the missing funds.  The supervisor conducting the investigation testified that he intended to convert the suspension to termination if the investigation determined that Chukes was responsible for the shortages.

The day after her suspension, October 27, 2012, Chukes claimed that another employee was terminated after rejecting sexual advances by a co-worker.  Thereafter, the supervisor conducting the investigation determined that Chukes was taking money from the safe, and Chukes’ employment was terminated.  Chukes sued for discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Those claims were dismissed in the United States District Court and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal.

Chukes tried to claim that her termination was discriminatory because funds were missing following the shift of another manager.  The Eleventh Circuit rejected that argument and relied upon the requirement that “the quantity and quality of the comparator’s misconduct be nearly identify to prevent courts from second-guessing employer’s reasonable decisions and confusing apples and oranges.”  The comparator had worked as a manager for years and money was only found missing once during his tenure.  In contrast, money was found missing three times during Chukes’s two-month employment period.

Federal courts regularly reject attempts by employees to compare their misconduct to that of other employees who are not terminated, because the comparator employees are not “nearly identical.”  Indeed, the “nearly identical” standard also played a role in a recent decision dismissing claims against Hyundai in Alabama: Eleventh Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Retaliation Claim Against Hyundai  Thus, the Chukes and Hyundai cases demonstrate the importance of implementing uniform standards of punishment for similar conduct by similar employees.

 

 

“Manager Rule” Protects Tuskegee From Retaliation Claim

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Manager

On April 21, 2016, Senior United States District Judge W. Harold Albritton found that Tuskegee University’s former Director of Human Resources, Ruby McMullen, could not sue the University for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  See McMullen v. Tusekegee University, No. 3:15CV16-WHA, 2016 WL 1601040 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 21, 2016).  Judge Albritton’s decision hinged upon the fact that Ms. McMullen’s arguably protected conduct occurred in the course of her normal job performance as Director of Human Resources.

On December 2, 2013, Tuskegee employee Tracy Boleware filed a complaint alleging harassment by University Vice-President Dr. Mohammad Bhuiyan.  Later that day, McMullen attended a meeting with Bhuiyan and the University’s General Counsel where termination of Boleware’s employment was discussed.  McMullen warned that termination of Boleware was, or might appear to be, retaliation for her harassment complaint.  McMullen was told that the University’s president had decided prior to December 2 to terminate Boleware’s employment.

After the December 2 meeting, McMullen met with the University President who told her that he did not feel she was on his team and wanted to let her know where she stood.  She also attended a subsequent meeting with the President, Bhuiyan and the General Counsel where they complained that she did not warn them about retaliation.  McMullen protested that she warned them in the December 2 meeting about the appearance of retaliation.

McMullen’s employment was terminated on January 21, 2014.  McMullen then sued Tuskegee for retaliation.  She claimed that Tuskegee retaliated against her, because she opposed the retaliatory termination of Boleware.

Judge Albrtitton granted summary judgment and dismissed the retaliation claim.  In part, he relied upon the “manager rule,” which holds:  “a management employee that, in the course of her normal job performance, disagrees with or opposes the actions of an employer, does not engage in ‘protected activity.'”  McMullen, 2016 WL 1601040 at *4.  “Instead, the employer engages in protected activity if she crosses the line from being an employee performing her job, to an employee lodging a personal complaint.”  Id. at *5.  Because McMullen opposed termination of Boleware in the course of her normal job performance as Director of Human Resources, Judge Albritton found that she could not successfully sue Tuskegee for retaliation.

The “manager rule”provides an effective defense for employers who are sued by managerial employees for retaliation.  Those employees are frequently required to give their advice and input regarding termination decisions.  If those managerial employees are later terminated themselves, the “manager rule” makes it very difficult for them to claim retaliation based upon their involvement in other termination decisions.

 

General Complaints About “Harassment” Are Not Protected By Title VII

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Harassment in its Many Forms and Types
Harassment in its Many Forms and Types

On April 18, 2016, United States District Court Judge David Proctor confirmed that generalized complaints by employees about “harassment” are not protected by Title VII.  Instead, the “harassment” complained about must be harassment that is prohibited by Title VII.  See Ellison v. City of Birmingham, No. 2:14-CV-00154-RDP, 2016 WL 1554927 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 18, 2016).

In Ellison, the employee sued for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that she was terminated for complaining about being harassed.  But, when complaining about harassment, an employee can only succeed if she possesses “a good faith, objectively reasonable belief that such harassment was unlawful under Title VII.”

While the employee in Ellison unquestionably complained about the way she was treated at work, Judge Proctor found that she did not complain about treatment that violated Title VII.  Instead, she complained about being: deemed a “troublemaker,” called a “devil” for “keeping up mess,” and called “baby duck” for following around behind a friend of hers.  Judge Proctor found that those complaints were merely about “unspecified personal conflict” and “wholly unrelated to Title VII.”

Judge Proctor’s decision simply reinforces the well-established principal that Title VII is not a “workplace civility code.”  Thus, not all “harassment” violates Title VII, and merely complaining about “harassment” does not grant protection under Title VII.  Instead, only complaints about harassment based upon a protected characteristic are entitled to protection.