pregnancy

Title VII, Premarital Sex and the Religious Employer

Robert C. Lockwood
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Title VII pregnancy discrimination Alabama Employment Law premarital sex religious employer
Employers who terminate employees for premarital sex risk violating Title VII’s rule against pregnancy discrimination.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act prohibit termination of employees because they are pregnant.  But, what if pregnancy is irrefutable evidence of premarital sex?  And, what if a religious employer has beliefs prohibiting premarital sex?  Can that employer terminate the pregnant employee without violating Title VII?  Those are the issues that United States Magistrate Judge Herman Johnson struggled with recently in Kelley v. Decatur Baptist Church, No. 5:17-CV-1239-HNJ, 2018 WL 2130433 (N.D. Ala. May 9, 2018).

Alexandria Kelley was employed by Decatur Baptist Church as a maintenance and child care employee.  She notified her employer in the Summer of 2015 that she was pregnant, and she was terminated shortly thereafter.  When Ms. Kelley sued in federal court, Decatur Baptist moved to dismiss her complaint, and argued that she was terminated because she engaged in sexual conduct outside of marriage — which violates biblical standards.  Judge Johnson denied that motion to dismiss, while leaving open the possibility for dismissal at a later stage of the litigation.

Decatur Baptist provided Judge Johnson with two legal arguments in support of dismissal.  First, the church argued that the “ecclesiastical abstention doctrine” barred Ms. Kelley’s claims.  Under that doctrine, courts do not decide issues connected to “theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or conformity of members of the church to the standards of morals required of them.”  Myhre v. Seventh-Day Adventist Church, 719 Fed. Appx. 926 (11th Cir. 2018).  (I previously wrote about courts’ reluctance to engage in ecclesiastical disputes here:  Ecclesiastical Disputes In Alabama.) Second, Decatur Baptist argued that Ms. Kelley’s claims were prohibited by the “ministerial exception,” which “precludes application of [employment discrimination laws] to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers.”  Kelley, 2018 WL 2130433 at *4.

Judge Johnson found that both of the church’s arguments were premature.  While the church claimed that its decision was based upon religious principals, Ms. Kelley’s complaint (which Judge Johnson was required to accept as completely true) alleged that the termination was based solely upon her pregnancy, and had nothing to do with religion.  Therefore, Judge Johnson gave Ms. Kelley the opportunity to engage in discovery in an attempt to provide evidence in support of her claim.

Decatur Baptist will unquestionably move to dismiss Ms. Kelley’s claims after discovery by filing a motion for summary judgment.  At that point, the church will probably also assert an additional fact-based defense — that it terminated Ms. Kelley for engaging in premarital sex, not for getting pregnant.  “Title VII does not protect any right to engage in premarital sex, but as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Title VII does protect the right to get pregnant.”  Hamilton v. Southland Christian School, Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2012).

 

Is Working From Home a Reasonable Accommodation?

Robert C. Lockwood
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ADA reasonable accommodation work from home alabama employment law
Sometimes, working from home is not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently found that an employer was not required to allow an employee to work from home as a reasonable accommodation for her pregnancy/disability.  Everett v. Grady Memorial Hosp. Corp., No. 16-13495, 2017 WL 3485226 (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 2017).

At the outset, let me stress that the reasonable accommodation analysis under the Americans with Disabilities Act is a case-by-case determination.  The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Everett depends on the specific facts of that case.  In other cases, involving other jobs, work-from-home might be a reasonable accommodation.  If one of your employees suffers from an impairment and asks to work from home, proceed very carefully.

In Everett, Ana Everett was employed as the Program Manager for Grady Memorial Hospital’s car seat program.  She was diagnosed with a high-risk pregnancy in February 2015 and granted FMLA intermittent leave at that time.  On April 28, 2015, Ms. Everett presented a doctor’s note placing her on “light duty.”  In May 2015, her doctor diagnosed her with an “incompetent cervix” and said she should work exclusively from home.  Grady refused to allow Ms. Everett to work from home.  Instead, Grady placed her on unpaid leave until her doctor allowed her to return to work on October 8, 2015.

Ms. Everett asserted several claims against Grady — including a claim for failure to accommodate her pregnancy/disability because she was not allowed to work from home.  This is where the fact-intensive nature of the accommodation analysis comes into play.  The issue was whether Ms. Everett could perform the essential functions of her job if she worked from home.  In short, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the relevant facts and found that teaching courses, supervising employees and meeting with patients were essential functions of the job.  Ms. Everett could not perform those essential functions if she worked from home.

Ms. Everett argued that Grady could assign those job duties to another employee as a reasonable accommodation, but the Eleventh Circuit rejected that argument.  “‘[T]he ADA does not require the employee to eliminate an essential function of the plaintiff’s job’ or place it upon someone else.”  Everett, 2017 WL 3485226 at *5.

Again, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Everett relied upon the fact that Ms. Everett’s presence at the work site was crucial to teach courses, supervise employees and meet with patients.  In other cases, particularly in those involving computer-intensive jobs, it might be reasonable to allow an employee with an impairment to work from home.